cause of the increasing availability of transfer and because of the growing number of cases, over two thousand cases are now transferred each year. 5 The interaction between these two trends-toward more frequent conflicts and more numerous transfers-raises a choice-of-law question: When a federal claim is transferred, should the transferee court apply the interpretation of the circuit in which the case was filed or of the circuit to which it was transferred? Until 1964, the lower federal courts that had confronted this problem agreed that the transferee court could apply its own interpretation. 6 Several of these courts noted that despite the divergent interpretations of federal law, it is a single body of rules applicable in all federal courts and parties are not entitled to select a preferred interpretation. In 1964, however, the Supreme Court held in Van Dusen v. Barrack' that the law of the state in which the transferor court sat 8 would continue to apply after a section 1404(a) transfer of a diversity case to a district court sitting in another state. Since then, lower courts have generally concluded that Van Dusen also requires application of the transferor circuit's interpretation of federal law to transferred federal claims. 9 Despite some murmuring of dissent, 10 however, neither courts nor commentators have analyzed the application of Van Dusen to transferred federal claims. That is the purpose of this Article.
The Article begins by briefly describing the operation of the federal transfer statutes. It then reviews Van Dusen's resolution of the choice-oflaw problem in diversity cases and finds that the decision was based on two grounds: the principles of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Co.,11 and the presumed legislative intent behind section 1404(a) to preserve the plaintiff's "venue privilege" to shop for favorable state law. Turning to questions of federal law, the Article finds that neither the existence of conflicts among the circuits nor the perception that circuits treat certain issues dif-5. See infra note 16; p. 681.
6. See infra p. 692.
376 U.S. 612 (1964).
8. This does not mean that the transferor state's substantive law will necessarily govern the case following transfer. The transferee court must apply the substantive law that the transferor court would have applied following a choice-of-law determination. Because Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) , requires a district court to apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits in a diversity case, see infra p. 682, the transferor state's choice-of-law rules identify the state whose substantive law will govern the case following transfer.
9. See infra p. 693. 10. Judge Henry Friendly has asserted that "I take [Van Dusen] to be limited to choices of state law." Friendly, The "Law of the Circuit" and All That, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 406, 412 (1972) (emphasis in original); see also In re Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R. Sec. & Antitrust Litig., 543 F.2d 1058 (3d Cir. 1976 ). There the court noted that others had applied Van Dusen to transfers of federal claims and observed, "It is difficult to understand why this should be so since Van Dusen i. Barrack involved conflicting state wrongful death policies, while in theory, at least, federal law, in its area of competence, is assumed to be nationally uniform, whether or not it is in fact." Id. at 1065 n.19 (emphasis in original).
11. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Vol. 93: 677, 1984 ferently is likely to be eliminated in the near future. Accordingly, the choice-of-law problem in transferred federal claims cases will endure. Against this background, the Article analyzes the proper handling of the choice-of-law question for transferred federal claims. It finds first that neither of Van Dusen's principles provides a sufficient reason to prefer the transferor circuit's interpretation in such cases. Erie is simply irrelevant where federal claims are involved, and its policies have no bearing on the choice between interpretations of federal law. The venue privilege is similarly inapposite once plaintiff's choice of forum has been vetoed by a transfer. The Van Dusen Court stressed the venue privilege because there is no federal principle by which to select the state law that should govern diversity cases. Where federal claims are transferred, however, the principle that the transferee federal court is competent to decide federal issues correctly indicates that the transferee's interpretation should apply. If Van Dusen compels the transferee court to decide the case in a way it views as wrong, then that court's competence is undermined. Moreover, application of the Van Dusen rule reduces the effectiveness of the transfer statutes by creating obstacles to the efficient handling of transferred federal claim cases. Van Dusen therefore should not govern such cases.
I. TRANSFER IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM
Until 1948, transfer of cases among federal courts was impossible. Dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens was the only remedy for abuse of venue provisions. In 1947 the Supreme Court confirmed the availability of such dismissal as a matter of federal common law where trial in the forum chosen by plaintiff would unreasonably burden defendant or the court. " ' Because it relies on dismissal, however, forum non conveniens is tailored for situations in which the more convenient forum is in a different judicial system.
In 1948, Congress provided section 1404(a) as an alternative to dismissal for cases where the more convenient forum is another federal court. Section 1404(a) authorizes the federal judge before whom a civil action is pending to transfer it "[flor the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice," albeit only to a district where venue and jurisdiction are proper. 1 3 On motions made under section 1404(a), the plain- 13. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976) . In Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960), the Supreme Court construed the statute to forbid transfer to a district where venue would not have been proper even though defendants moved to transfer and therefore were clearly willing to waive any objections to venue.
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 93: 677, 1984 tiff's choice of venue is generally accorded substantial weight and the moving party must make a showing of inconvenience sufficient to overcome it. 14 But that showing need not be sufficient to justify dismissal. 1 " After transfer, the transferee district court has full responsibility for disposition of the case, and appeal from its judgment is to the transferee circuit's court of appeals. Recently, about 2,000 cases per year have been transferred under section 1404(a). - In 1968, Congress added a major transfer provision, the Multidistrict Litigation Act. 17 This statute, based on the experiences of the federal courts with voluntary pretrial coordination of thousands of electrical equipment price-fixing antitrust cases," 8 authorized transfer of cases having a common question of fact to a single district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial procedures. Transfers under the newer statute are made not by a single judge, as is true under section 1404(a), but rather by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. 19 The statute provides that transfers should depend on the convenience of the witnesses and parties and on judicial efficiency. But as a practical matter the Panel gives considerations of judicial economy primary importance; the interests of the parties thus receive correspondingly less emphasis. 20 Cases may be trans- ferred to any district, whether or not jurisdiction or venue would originally have been proper there. 2 1 Once the Panel has designated a given set of facts for multidistrict treatment, any cases filed later that involve the same fact issues are automatically transferred as "tag-along" cases to the court designated by the Multidistrict Panel unless a party files , a motion to vacate the transfer order.
2 2 During the first fourteen years of its operation, the Panel transferred an average of more than 500 cases annually; 23 for the last five years it has transferred an average of 860 cases per year. 24 Although the multidistrict transfer statute authorizes transfer only for pretrial purposes, and specifically provides that the cases shall be remanded to the transferor district for trial, 2 5 only a few cases are ever remanded. 2 ' The transferee judge has complete authority to make pretrial rulings, including an order to transfer the trial to his own district under section 1404(a). 27 Not surprisingly, transferee judges immersed in complex cases often feel that a transfer under section 1404(a) would promote justice because a remand would waste their hard-earned understanding of the issues and would impose an unnecessary burden on the judge to whom the case is remanded. Even without a transfer under section 1404(a), transferee judges can often dispose of part or all of a case on summary judgment; 2 8 one commentator has observed that "transferee courts have usually attempted to decide all substantive issues in the litigation. court could indirectly affect the choice of law by dismissing on grounds of forum non conveniens, since dismissal would compel the plaintiff to refile in another state, whose choice-of-law rules would subsequently apply. Dismissal is the only situation, however, in which a federal court has an independent role to play in deciding which state's law will apply to a claim based on state law.
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Transfer within the fedeial system greatly complicates the application of Klaxon. Almost from the beginning, section 1404(a) created a new species of choice-of-law problem in diversity cases: Should the transferee court apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits or the state in which the transferor court sits? In 1950 California law would apply after a transfer, and the case would then simply be dismissed as time-barred.
The Tenth Circuit reversed. It held that the passage of section 1404(a) limited the district court's power to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens to situations in which transfer to the more convenient forum was impossible." Since transfer to California was clearly possible, dismissal was forbidden. The court concluded further that transfer would not affect the law applied to the case. It explained that plaintiff had a "legal right to select any forum where the defendant was amenable to process" and that 39. Currie posited three possibilities: (1) applying the law of the transferee state; (2) applying the law of the transferor state; and (3) applying the law of the transferor state unless that state would dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens. He found the first obnoxious to Erie because the substantive law would change if the accident of diversity allowed the case into federal court. He questioned the second because cases filed in federal court would be governed by the choice-of-law rules of a state that would have dismissed the action on forum non conveniens grounds. He found the third inadequate because of the difficulty of deciding whether the state court would dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds; if so, whether it would condition that dismissal on some agreement regarding the applicable law; and whether, in the event of such dismissal, the plaintiff would refile in the state to which transfer is ordered under § 1404(a). See Currie, supra note 38, at 438-53.
saw no reason to interpret the statute to protect the wanton forum shopping exhibited in Headrick.'° He proposed instead that the federal courts develop "enlightened principles of conflicts of law" to decide what law should apply following transfer. 41 Five years later, however, he published a retraction, 42 in which he explained that his earlier proposal was "fundamentally and impossibly wrong ' 43 because no choice-of-law system could be developed in the abstract without an examination of the interests of the various states involved. As a consequence, Currie concluded that the problem of choice of law after transfer was "insoluble . . . while diversity jurisdiction exists"' 4 because "no choice-of-law rule can possibly be invented that will do anything more than subordinate the policy of one state to that of the other.' 4 5 Despite Currie's pessimism, in 1964 the Supreme Court decided how federal courts should handle the choice-of-law problem in transfer of diversity cases. In Van Dusen v. Barrack,' 8 the Supreme Court adopted much of Headrick's reasoning to hold that the law of the transferor court should govern in such transfers. The suits in Van Dusen were brought by personal representatives of Pennsylvania residents killed when an airliner bound for Philadelphia crashed in Boston Harbor shortly after takeoff. Pursuant to section 1404(a), the district court ordered the forty actions filed in Pennsylvania transferred to Massachusetts, where over one hundred other actions were already pending.' 7 Plaintiffs opposed the transfer on the ground that they would be harmed by the differences between the Pennsylvania and Massachusetts measures of damages in wrongful death cases. 48 Like most states, Pennsylvania allowed recovery to compensate for 40. Currie's theory was that § 1404(a) evolved from forum non conveniens even though it was different in significant respects from the common law doctrine. Accordingly, he felt that the elimination of the power to dismiss (with its concomitant power to affect which choice-of-law rules apply) implied some authority for the federal court directly to affect choice of law. See Currie, supra note 38, at 466-67.
41. As posited by Currie, this system would begin with the premise that transferor law should apply, and would require the party desiring a change in law to justify it. As part of the transfer process the transferor court could, however, decide that some other law "ought" to apply. In making this determination, the court should not, he reasoned, select the law of the transferee state simply because it is the transferee. Instead, pursuant to a "federal law of conflict of laws," it should, as part of the transfer order, direct that the specified law apply after transfer. 48. Plaintiffs also argued that, because they were not qualified in Massachusetts to act as representatives of the estates of the deceased, defendants could claim after transfer that plaintiffs lacked Vol. 93: 677, 1984 loss, but Massachusetts measured damages based on the culpability of the defendant's conduct and limited the award to $20,000.' Assuming the Pennsylvania choice-of-law rules would call for application of the Pennsylvania measure of damages, but that after transfer Massachusetts choice-of-law rules would apply pursuant to Klaxon and would require reference to the Massachusetts damage measure, plaintiffs claimed that this adverse change in law should preclude transfer.
The Supreme Court, however, held that transfer was not precluded by differences between Pennsylvania law and Massachusetts law because "[a] change of venue under § 1404(a) generally should be, with respect to state law, but a change of courtrooms." 50 Accordingly, Pennsylvania choice-oflaw rules would still determine the proper measure of damages. The Court reserved the question whether the same principles would preserve transferor law if the plaintiff requested the transfer or if the state in which the case was originally filed would itself have dismissed the case on forum non conveniens grounds." 1 With respect to defendants' motions to transfer diversity cases, however, the choice-of-law issue was settled.
The Van Dusen Court defined the issue primarily as one of statutory construction, but it relied heavily upon Headrick to support its analysis. 5 " First, the Court characterized section 1404(a) as a "judicial housekeeping measure" designed only to ameliorate the geographical inconvenience of trial in a distant forum. 53 Given this limited purpose, the Court found that the statute "was not designed to narrow the plaintiff's venue privilege or to defeat the state-law advantages that might accrue from the exercise of this venue privilege." 54 Otherwise, it noted, defendants could turn the transfer statute itself into a device for forum shopping.
Second, the Court reasoned that its statutory interpretation was supported by the Erie policy of uniformity of law within a state, a policy which also led to Klaxon's requirement that federal courts apply the capacity to sue. Id. at 615. Rule 17(b) provides that capacity of an individual acting in a representative capacity to sue "shall be determined by the law of the state in which the district court is held," FED. R choice-of-law rules of the states in which they sit. 5 For purposes of this policy, the Court explained, "the critical identity to be maintained is between the federal district court which decides the case and the courts of the State in which the action was filed." 5 ' Therefore, the accident of diversity in the Pennsylvania cases should not result in the application of another state's law.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONFLICTS AMONG THE CIRCUITS
In an ideal system, Van Dusen problems would not arise in transfers of cases involving federal claims because all courts would interpret federal law uniformly. But the system is not ideal; historical development and current necessity make conflicts among the circuits inevitable. Before 1891, appellate review in the federal system was basically limited to review by the Supreme Court. 5 " In this system there were few opportunities for conflicting interpretations of federal law, 58 58. While conflicting interpretations were not a great concern, the absence of effective appellate supervision created arbitrary and disparate results. The ineffectiveness of review by the circuit courts, on which the district judges themselves sat, often made it appear that district judges had untrammelled power to decide as they pleased. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 57, at 87-88. As one contemporary observer described review of their own decisions by district judges: "Such an appeal is not from Philip drunk to Philip sober, but from Philip sober to Philip intoxicated with the vanity of a matured opinion and doubtless also a published decision." Hill, The Federal Judicial System The Evarts Act provided for resolution of intercircuit conflicts through Supreme Court review on writ of certiorari. The leading commentators on the Supreme Court's practice assert that uniformity of decision among the courts of appeals was a primary purpose of the certiorari jurisdiction. 66 Although others disagree, 67 the Supreme Court has identified the exislant's argument, "even though we should be convinced of its correctness," because issue had already been resolved against appellant's position by circuit As an appellate court, we strive to maintain uniformity in the law among the circuits, wherever reasoned analysis will allow, thus avoiding unnecessary burdens on the Supreme Court docket. Unless our 11 courts of appeals are thus willing to promote a cohesive network of national law, needless division and confusion will encourage further splintering and the formation of otherwise unnecessary additional tiers in the framework of our national court system. The Supreme Court's eventual resolution of many intercircuit conflicts does not make these conflicts unimportant. Ordinarily there is a substantial delay between the first decision on a legal issue over which a conflict develops and an eventual resolution by the Supreme Court. 74 During the interregnum, the lower courts must decide the cases before them, and undoubtedly plaintiffs in some circuits fare better than those in others precisely because of the differing approaches of the circuits. This disparity, in turn, may impose significant changes in interpretation upon transferred cases. 7 5 Thus, even when the system works with reasonable dispatch, there is the potential for disparate results. Moreover, the Supreme Court is vulnerable to fragmentation akin to that in lower courts; the Court's actual resolution of issues often leaves room for continuing differences among the circuits. statute against federal challenge, partly on ground that in former situation there is no threat to uniformity of federal law The Supreme Court's heavy caseload has made matters increasingly difficult. Commentators now regularly assert that the Court can no longer decide enough cases to resolve the existing conflicts among the circuits.' Meanwhile, the exploding dockets of the courts of appeals and the attendant increases in the number of circuit judges have increased the likelihood of future conflicts not only between circuits but even within circuits. There is real concern that the number of intracircuit conflicts will rise geometrically as the number of judges on the larger courts mounts.", The pressures to split circuits, which led to the subdivision of the Fifth Circuit, have therefore also increased. Indeed, a respected circuit judge recently predicted that there may eventually be a federal circuit for every state."' While such fragmentation of circuits may reduce the frequency of intracircuit conflicts, it obviously multiplies the potential of intercircuit conflicts. 8 0
Over the last fifteen years, the prospect of increased conflicts has stimulated a number of proposals to create a new National Court of Appeals to resolve such conflicts." 1 In 1983, bills were introduced in both the Senate and the House to create a temporary Intercircuit Tribunal of the United States Courts of Appeals to perform that function. 82 But the sense of Ar- 82. See S. 455, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S1948, S1956 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1983); H.R. 1970, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H1192-93 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1983). The characteristics of any tribunal that might be created remain uncertain. The original House and Senate bills closely resemble one another, calling for the creation of a tribunal staffed by twenty-seven or twentyeight sitting judges of the courts of appeals, selected by the circuit councils. Cases would be referred to the new tribunal by the Supreme Court and decided by randomly selected panels of five judges. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, these decisions would bind the courts of appeals. The proposed tribunal would go out of existence after an experimental period of five years. On June 29, 1983, the Subcommittee on Courts of the Senate Judiciary Committee reported out the Senate version with substantial amendments. As amended, the Senate bill calls for an en banc court with nine judges and four alternates, designated by a majority of the Supreme Court and sitting for staggered terms. S. 645, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (Subomm. Print 1983) (on file with author). mageddon is far from universal, and proposals for reform have provoked spirited opposition. Opponents of the new court argue that its creation would undermine the Supreme Court's function and sense of responsibility. 83 Some claim that the Supreme Court remains capable of resolving all "genuine" conflicts. 8 ' Others contend that divergent interpretations of federal law actually help the Supreme Court because they fully air issues before the Court is called upon to decide them. 85 It has even been suggested that regional disparities in interpreting federal law are desirable. 86 Given this opposition, it is unclear whether Congress will create an Intercircuit Tribunal any time soon. 87 Beyond these political considerations, the likelihood that the proposed Intercircuit Tribunal would eliminate conflicts between the circuits is small. At best this body would be a stop-gap measure that, with its possibly shifting membership, 88 offers little hope for a long-term solution. If a more permanent court is created some day, 8 9 conflicts between the circuits Chief Justice Burger has endorsed this temporary measure and urged that another congressional commission be created to formulate a more permanent solution. See Burger, supra note 1, at 445, 447 (1983). The Chief Justice, however, does not see the proposal as a panacea. On the contrary, his endorsement is quite qualified: "I assure you at the outset that if I knew precisely how to solve this problem I would not hesitate to say so, but I do not have the answers." Id. at 444. Ct. 2438 Ct. , 2438 ("I believe that further consideration of the substantive and procedural ramifications of the problem by other courts will enable us to deal with the issue more wisely at a later date.").
See
86. See Hruska Commission, supra note 1, at 235 (rejecting specialized nationwide courts as solution to burden of appellate caseload because they "would tend to dilute or eliminate regional influence in the decision of those cases"). 88. A system calling for decisions by five judges chosen by lot from among twenty-seven members of a court with shifting membership, see supra note 82, hardly suggests great consistency of attitude among panels. Even the Senate's amended bill, proposing a court of nine members and four alternates, raises substantial concern about variations in personnel. In this connection, it is worth noting that the congressional commission that studied the problem rejected manning its proposed court on a rotating basis because "[a] court so composed would lack the stability and continuity that are essential to the development of national law." Hruska Commission, supra note 1, at 237-38.
89. Congressional action may not occur until the 1990's. To illustrate, in a 1981 article, Professor Daniel Meador, a proponent of reform, suggested a timetable leading to a legislative solution by 1989.
will not magically vanish. There will still be a delay between the appearance of a conflict and its resolution by the new tribunal. Moreover, the new court may be unable to resolve issues as definitively as the Supreme Court can. 9 0 Perhaps most significantly, the widespread perception among lawyers that the circuits have different attitudes toward certain issues will endure. 9 1 Although more frequent review of court of appeals decisions might iron out such differences, 9 2 the belief that one circuit views particular claims more charitably than another is likely to persist.
Thus, while modification of the appellate system may reduce conflicts among circuits, 93 incentives to engage in forum shopping will persist. The question here is not whether such forum shopping is inherently bad, 4 but only whether the effort to capture a favorable interpretation, or merely a friendly reception, should be immunized against a transfer from one circuit to another. The ongoing debate about reforming the federal appellate machinery is no reason to disregard that question. 
See Griswold, Rationing Justice-The Supreme Court's Caseload and What the Court Does
Not Do, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 341-42 (1975) (arguing that courts of appeals lack "institutional responsibility" about avoiding conflicts because they know their decisions will not be reviewed; if ten percent of court of appeals decisions were reviewed, "the law would soon be clarified and stabilized").
93. Conflicts are easy to identify at present. In the securities area, the courts conflict on whether the sale of all stock in a business should be treated as a transaction involving the sale of securities within the meaning of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. It is evil only if something evil flows from it; indeed, the very idea of the diversity jurisdiction was to provide an alternative to state court.") (footnote omitted).
IV. THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING VAN DUSEN TO TRANSFERS OF FEDERAL CLAIMS
However troubling conflicts among the circuits may be from the perspective of judicial administration, they ordinarily do not present choiceof-law problems in the resolution of individual cases. Instead, a court applying federal law to a given case analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the contending approaches advanced by the parties. Such analysis often involves examining relevant decisions by courts in other circuits, but only as aids to interpretation, not as binding determinations.
A transfer complicates matters, however, when it moves a case from a circuit in which one interpretation applies to another circuit in which a conflicting interpretation prevails. As shown in Part III, the number of intercircuit conflicts is substantial. There is, however, no way to determine how often a transfer moves a case to a circuit with an interpretation that conflicts with the transferor's, but the number of transfers of federal claims is also substantial. In 1965, Professor Edmund Kitch reported that approximately forty percent of all cases transferred under section 1404(a) involved claims based on special federal jurisdictional statutes. 9 5 Given the increase in the number of cases raising federal claims since then," 6 it is reasonable to assume that a significant proportion of all transfers under section 1404(a) are federal claims. Transfers of federal claims cases under the multidistrict litigation statute are also numerous, given the frequency of multidistrict treatment of securities and antitrust cases." 7 Thus sheer numbers show that the problem is significant.
Before Van Dusen was decided, several lower courts asserted that differences in interpretation of federal law were irrelevant to the decision whether to transfer, and that the transferee court should decide the issues of federal law without regard to the views of the transferor circuit. 9 " Van Dusen was expressly limited to differences in state law, 99 but after it was decided many lower courts concluded-without analysis-that its reasoning would govern transferred federal claim cases as well. 0 instances, however, the actual issue was selection of the state law that would provide the limitations period for the federal claim, not interpretation of federal law. 10 1 A few lower courts continued to disregard transferor law. 0 2 None gave the question much attention, however.
To determine whether Van Dusen should apply to the transferred federal claims, we must analyze the applicability of its rationale to such cases. An examination of the two principal grounds for that decision-the Erie doctrine and the notion that the venue privilege gives plaintiff a right to the transferor court's interpretation-shows that neither provides a basis for applying Van Dusen to transferred federal claims. 115. One oft-mentioned Erie concern-deterring forum shopping-seems to have little relevance and was not alluded to by the Court in Van Dusen. Presumably the reason is that any rule promotes one type of forum shopping and prevents another. Thus, the Court's holding in Van Dusen overtly protects the benefits of plaintiffs' forum shopping (under the acquired rights rubric) and precludes forum shopping by defendants via § 1404(a) motions. The opposite holding would, of course, have reduced the incentives for plaintiffs to forum shop and increased the incentive for defendants to use § 1404(a) motions for that purpose.
A. The Policy Underlying
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in Erie, it is unfair to discriminate between those who can gain admission to federal court on the basis of diversity and those who are confined to state court by the fortuity of their residence."' 6 So viewed, Erie seeks to assure that the result would be the same in either court. Second, Erie guards the integrity of state policy. As the Court explained in Klaxon, it "leaves to a state . . .the right to pursue local policies diverging from those of its neighbors."" ' The Van Dusen Court rightly concluded that these concerns would be imperiled if courts interpreted section 1404(a) to give defendants "a change of law as a bonus for a change of venue" in transferred diversity cases. 18 Had Massachusetts law been substituted for Pennsylvania law in Van Dusen because of a transfer, which would not have been available in state court, the outcome would have been different due to the accident of diversity that allowed the case into federal court. 1 1 9 Allowing the "procedural" device of transfer to effect such a change in the substantive law would unfairly distinguish between litigants on the basis of residence and thus would violate the first principle of Erie.
A change from Pennsylvania law to Massachusetts law would also threaten the policies and interests of Pennsylvania. At the time the Court decided Van Dusen, it was unclear whether the Pennsylvania courts would choose to apply their own measure of damages or the Massachusetts measure.
12 1 Subsequent developments indicated that the Pennsylvania courts would apply their own law, 2 These same considerations do not apply to federal claims. The problem of unfairness vanishes because all litigants can gain access to federal court regardless of citizenship. 122 Concerns over state policy are similarly unimportant where federal claims are involved. If state policies are inconsistent with federal law, they must give way under the supremacy clause. 2 Moreover, there is no federal or circuit interest in the application of a particular interpretation of federal law that is analogous to the interest a state might have in the application of its law to a particular case. Indeed, because the lower federal courts are to construe federal law independently, the true federal interest is having the court which decides the case apply its own interpretation of federal law.
B. Acquired Rights and the "Venue Privilege"
Van Dusen emphasized the advantages flowing from exercise of plaintiff's "venue privilege" as a predicate for its holding that, as to issues of state law, Congress did not intend a transfer under section 1404(a) to eliminate those advantages.
12 4 But Van Dusen did not articulate any theoretical basis for concluding that, by exercising the venue privilege, plaintiff acquires the right to have a certain state's law apply. Analysis ultimately leads to the conclusion that there is none. Instead, the Court's emphasis on the venue privilege appears to result from the absence of federal principles for choice of state law, turning the selection of law into a game of chess in which the plaintiff gets the opening move. 2 5 The overlay of a federal system that permits transfer to a court sitting in a different state makes the value of that first move even more significant by precluding dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens which would result in a change of law.
The plaintiff's venue privilege and the resultant choice-of-law advantages are deeply ingrained in our jurisprudential psyche. Professor Moore, Arguably the potential for a change in result due to the transfer of a federal claim from one circuit to another creates an analogous risk of unfairness, but this issue has no bearing on the discussion in the text for two reasons. First, the "unfairness" does not result from the accident of diversity and it is therefore not the same as the Erie concern. Second, and more important, there is simply no unfairness in view of the principle of competence discussed infra at Part V. To the contrary, parties have no right to select a preferred interpretation of federal law. See infra pp. 706-07. Where the initial forum is sufficiently inconvenient to justify a transfer, the parties can hardly object to a possible difference in interpretation of federal law. 124. See 376 U.S. at 633-34. 125. Cf Currie, supra note 38, at 441 (describing change of venue as "game of chess, with Section 1404(a) authorizing a knight's move; and nothing would be certain except that the parties would land on a square of a different color") (footnote omitted), quoted in Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 636 n.34.
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who originally proposed section 1404(a), has argued that even where plaintiff himself moves to transfer he should be permitted to keep the state law of the original forum so long as it was a proper venue." 2 " He reasons that plaintiff has a right to insist on keeping the case there (or make defendant move to transfer, thereby invoking Van Dusen), so that the fact that plaintiff takes the initiative regarding transfer should be unimportant. Another commentator has suggested that even if the state in which the case was originally filed would dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens, the applicable state law should remain unchanged after a transfer under section 1404(a). 27 The argument is that the state court dismisses only because it has no other way to move the case to the appropriate forum, not to effect a change in law. Since section 1404(a) allows such a transfer in the federal court system, the incidental change of law that attends a dismissal need not carry over into the federal system. Thus, there is a pervasive inclination to leave the choice of state law to the plaintiff if he complies with venue and jurisdictional limitations.
The problem with this approach is that choice-of-law decisions do not flow naturally from venue provisions. Although a determination of venue may involve some considerations pertinent to choice of law, venue traditionally has focused on geographic convenience to defendant by limiting the number of locations in which plaintiff may file suit.' Venue reform has therefore addressed the relative burdens on plaintiffs and defendants of litigating at a distance. When Congress has concluded that the burden was unfair to plaintiffs it has expanded the number of venues available to the plaintiff, as it did by amending the Federal Employer's Liability Act 12 and by enacting a broad general venue provision for suits against corporations.°3 0 This focus on geographical convenience is also reflected in forum non conveniens decisions, where courts repeatedly emphasize the legitimacy of plaintiffs' decisions to sue at home.' Identifying the con- Transfer of venue brings the intended and unintended effects of broad venue into sharp and ironic focus. As Professor Edmund Kitch has observed, "the congressional policy of the venue provision to favor the plaintiff is in irreconcilable conflict with the congressional policy incorporated in the transfer section to protect the defendant against an inconvenient forum.
1' 32 The transfer section is intended, on a case-by-case basis, to accomplish the original objective of venue provisions and limit a plaintiff's ability to impose undue geographical burdens on a defendant. Once plaintiff's original choice of forum has been overridden by a transfer, the reason for giving plaintiff a broad choice of venues in the first place ceases to apply. Indeed, any connection between the convenience of the forum and the choice of law would point to preferring the law of the transferee. Ironically, however, even though his choice of location has been taken away from him, plaintiff's incidental choice of law is still protected under a theory of acquired rights. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 1 " 3 a 1981 Supreme Court decision, shows that there is little inherent force to the acquired rights notion, particularly when balanced against concerns about forum shopping. In Piper, the Court held that the prospect of a significant change in law is immaterial to the decision whether to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens. The claims there arose out of an airplane crash in Scotland that killed five Scottish citizens. Since Scottish law apparently did not authorize product liability claims, plaintiffs hired a California lawyer, 13 who had his secretary appointed administratrix of the estates of the decedents to take advantage of American strict liability law. Without dissent, 138 the Supreme Court rejected the Third Circuit's position and held that no substantial weight should be given to the prospect of a change of law in deciding a forum non conveniens motion. 3 9 In part, the Court reacted to the spectre that large numbers of foreign plaintiffs injured by products manufactured in the United States would sue in this country to take advantage of favorable American products liability law.
40
Implicitly, however, the Court also rejected a broad view of the notion that a plaintiff who has sued in a proper venue acquires a right to the law applied there. By the time the motion to dismiss was decided in the Pennsylvania district court, both venue and jurisdiction requirements were unquestionably satisfied. Plaintiff had exercised her "venue privilege," and had even advanced an arguable American interest in application of American product liability laws: Since American firms market their products domestically as well as overseas, American courts should apply domestic law to deter the harmful activities giving rise to the claim and thereby protect American citizens. 139. The Court did acknowledge that a change in law would be significant if, as a result of dismissal, plaintiff were "deprived of any remedy." Id. at 254-55. It is not clear whether that reasoning would apply if, for example, the foreign jurisdiction would hold the claim barred by the statute of limitations.
140. See 454 U.S. at 251-52.
141. Id. at 260-61. The Court found that "the incremental deterrence that would be gained if this trial were held in an American court is likely to be insignificant." Id. the court, dismissal would be proper unless plaintiff could offer "specific reasons of convenience supporting his choice." ' 142 Such a showing would be difficult, the Court suggested, where plaintiff chose the forum "solely in order to . . . take advantage of favorable law. 1 4 3 Further, noting that due to broad venue provisions plaintiffs would ordinarily choose the forum with favorable law, 144 it emphasized that "the deference accorded a plaintiff's choice of forum has never been intended to guarantee that the plaintiff will be able to select the law that will govern the case.' 14 Rather than condone use of the venue privilege to capture favorable law, the Court condemned it. The Court distinguished Van Dusen on the ground that a dismissal for forum non conveniens differed from a transfer under section 1404(a) because the latter allowed "easy change of venue within a unified federal system." ' 14 " Although the international character of Reyno did distinguish it from section 1404(a) situations,1 4 7 at bottom the case showed that the Court places little faith in the acquired rights theory.
Why then did Van Dusen place such emphasis on acquired rights? The answer is essentially the reason Professor Currie eventually threw up his hands in despair: There are no federal choice-of-law principles that favor application of the law of one state over the law of another.'
48 Admittedly, the due process clause does prevent a state from applying its own law to a case with which it has no substantial contacts. 4 147. The opinion in Reyno stated that the district court had been "fully justified" in giving the plaintiff's choice of venue less weight because the real parties in interest were "foreign." 454 U.S. at 255. The Court reasoned that "[w]hen the home forum has been chosen, it is reasonable to assume that this choice is convenient. When the plaintiff is foreign, however, this assumption is much less reasonable." Id. at 255-56. This reasoning applies, of course, whether the plaintiff is a non-American or an Alaskan suing in Florida. Because Justices Brennan, White, and Stevens dissented from this portion of the opinion, on the ground that it was beyond the question presented for review, only four Justices joined it. See id. at 261-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (joined by Brennan, J.); id. at 261 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Accordingly, this aspect of the opinion hardly detracts from the actual holding that a plaintiff's desire to shop for favorable law is entitled to little consideration.
148 151. At the outset, it is worthwhile to reject special federal venue statutes as grounds for deciding the issue in cases based on statutory schemes with such provisions. Several federal statutory schemes, such as the Federal Employers' Liability Act (F.E.L.A.), 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1976), and the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1982), do have their own venue provisions which apply in place of the general venue provisions. One could argue that these federal pronouncements represent decisions by Congress to allow plaintiffs to choose the interpretations of federal law that should govern their cases. This view is supported by Supreme Court decisions holding that, in the face of such congressional decisions to broaden venue, the federal courts could not dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds if a case were filed in a proper venue. Thus, in United States v. National City Lines, 334 U.S. 573 (1948) (National City Lines I), the Court held that forum non conveniens could not be applied to an antitrust action. It reasoned that "the choice of venues expressly given to the plaintiff is not to be qualified by any power of a court having venue," id. at 578, because Congress' purpose in providing broad venue was "to provide broader and more effective relief, both substantively and procedurally, for persons injured by violations of its antitrust policy." In view of the Court's reference in National City Lines I to Congress' desire to provide broader relief "substantively," one might argue that the Court believed that Congress approved of forum shopping for favorable interpretations of federal law. The argument is not persuasive. First, the Court held that § 1404(a) is not similarly limited. In United States v. National City Lines, 337 U.S. 78 (1949) (National City Lines 11), decided less than a year after National City Lines I, it upheld transfer of the same case under § 1404(a). There is no question that such cases can be transferred pursuant to the multidistrict transfer statute, see supra note 97 (detailing number of transfers of antitrust cases). Due to the special venue provision in antitrust cases, the burden of justifying a § 1404(a) transfer may be heavier than in other litigation. See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 89 F.R.D. 497, 500 (C.D. Cal. 1981). Nevertheless, as with other venue matters, see supra pp. 697-98, once plaintiff's geographical choice is overridden the gest that conflicts between the circuits reflect efforts to deal with local problems, 152 but no federal doctrine prefers the interpretation of the circuit in which the transactions underlying the case occurred. To the contrary, the applicable interpretation is that of the circuit in which the case is filed unless the case is transferred. One must therefore look beyond choice of law to locate an applicable federal principle.
Such a principle stems from the very source of the problem of conflicts between circuits-the system of review established by the Evarts Act.
153
That system assumes that the courts of appeals are competent to decide questions of federal law correctly and mandates that they do so, subject only to review by the Supreme Court. 54 This principle of competence undercuts any rule that would require the transferee court to follow another circuit's interpretation of federal law. Neither the legislative history nor the policy of the transfer statutes provides a reason for overriding this principle.
A. The Principle of Competence
For federal courts, the most significant choice-of-law difference between issues of state law and issues of federal law is that they lack competence to decide the former and are presumptively competent to decide the latter. Swift v. Tyson held that federal courts were competent to develop rules of decision for issues of state law. Erie unequivocally rejected that proposition and reserved such determinations for the states. The situation is materially different for issues of federal law, which the federal courts have not only the power but the duty to decide correctly. There is no room in the federal system of review for rote acceptance of the decision of a court outside the chain of direct review. If a federal court simply accepts the interpretation of another circuit without addressing the merits, it is not doing its job.
This principle follows naturally from the structure of appellate review venue choice should have little impact on choice of law. Second, as described infra pp. 707-08, the congressional regulatory goal actually cuts in favor of the principle of competence and against emphasizing plaintiff's interest.
152. See supra p. 690. 153. The Circuit Courts of Appeals Act of 1891, supra note 59. 154. A somewhat analogous choice-of-law principle, the supposed propriety of preferring a "better" rule of law, has been suggested as a legitimate factor in selecting rules to decide cases governed by state law. See Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 267, 295-304 (1966) . The notion seems to be that enlightened judges can thereby sidestep anachronistic rules of law by choosing to apply the modern law of another state. Not surprisingly, this concept has been criticized as overly subjective. See E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2.11 (1982) . But with issues of federal law in the federal system, an analogous notion is proper under the principle of competence: The forum circuit's interpretation is always the better law because it is, in the eyes of the forum court, the correct one.
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Vol. 93: 677, 1984 established by the Evarts Act. Despite early doubts, 155 the independence of the circuits was quickly established. Thus, in a 1908 case, the Seventh Circuit, after noting that the contentions made by the appellant had all been rejected by the Second Circuit, agreed that appellant "is right in claiming that he is entitled to our independent consideration and judgment."' 56 It then analyzed the issues and reached the same result as the Second Circuit.
15 7 The important point, however, is that the Seventh Circuit was not content simply to accept the Second Circuit's decision. It thereby affirmed the rule of competence that has endured to the present.
Appropriately, the principle is dramatically illustrated by an important transfer case, Hoffman v. Blaski.' 58 Plaintiffs there sued in Texas, defendants' residence. The district court granted defendants' motion to transfer to Illinois, plaintiffs' residence," 5 9 under section 1404(a). Claiming that section 1404(a) did not authorize the transfer because jurisdiction and venue were not proper in Illinois, plaintiffs petitioned the Fifth Circuit for a writ of mandamus. That court of appeals denied the petition, squarely holding that the transfer was proper because defendants agreed to waive jurisdictional objections.'" 0 After the case was transferred, plaintiffs moved to remand it to Texas on the same grounds that the Fifth Circuit had rejected. The Seventh Circuit agreed with plaintiffs, and granted their petition for a writ of mandamus, concluding that it was not bound by the Fifth Circuit decision: "[W]e think the decision of the Fifth Circuit in this matter is erroneous. Such being the case, we are under no more obligation to follow it as the law of the case than that Circuit would 
363 U.S. 335 (1960).
159. It may initially seem odd that plaintiffs would oppose transfer to their home district, much less go to the effort of petitioning two courts of appeals to vindicate their right to remain in the defendants' home district. But plaintiffs' behavior demonstrates that modification of the federal appellate structure probably will not entirely eliminate forum shopping. Plaintiffs in Hoffinan charged the defendants with violating plaintiffs' patent. The Seventh Circuit had long been regarded as tough on plaintiffs asserting claims under patents, and quick to hold patents invalid. Thus, plaintiffs' efforts to keep the case out of their home district presumably reflected their desire to avoid the Seventh Circuit. As indicated above, see supra pp. 690-91, such perceived differences between circuits will not change if a new court is added to the appellate system. With patents, the matter has been resolved by shifting all appellate jurisdiction in patent cases to courts have never had jurisdiction over cases involving anticipated federal defenses to state law claims in the absence of diversity of citizenship. 16 8 Today, except for claims within exclusive federal jurisdiction, the state courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction over federal claims and must therefore frequently decide issues of federal law. 169 Subject to review by the Supreme Court, 17 0 they are competent to do so, and there is accordingly no requirement that they accept the interpretation of any lower federal court. 1 ' In fact, a series of recent Supreme Court decisions emphasizes the right and responsibilty of state courts to decide federal issues without interference from the lower federal courts. 170. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976). 171. As Professor Stolz has argued, the absence of scrutiny by any lower federal court argues in favor of creation of a national court of appeals to review state court decisions in federal question cases. Stolz, supra note 167, at 964-74.
172. Because civil cases raising federal claims can generally be removed to federal court, see supra p. 696, the cases in which the Court has articulated its confidence in state court disposition of federal issues, not surprisingly, have involved state criminal proceedings. Beginning with Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Court has on several occasions overturned federal court orders that interdicted state court criminal proceedings claimed to infringe the federal constitutional rights of the state court defendants. As the Court explained, Younger was intended to "permit state courts to try state cases free from interference by federal courts." Id. Circuit was asked to overturn an order transferring a case to the District of Minnesota in the Eighth Circuit. Plaintiff, a stockholder asserting a claim under the Investment Company Act of 1940, x 75 argued that transfer was improper because the Eighth Circuit did not allow a stockholder to sue under that statute, while the Second Circuit did. Since transfer would therefore be tantamount to dismissal of his claim, plaintiff contended it was unauthorized because Minnesota was not a district in which the action could have been brought, as required by section 1404(a). 1 78 The Second Circuit accepted arguendo that the law of the Eighth Circuit was as plaintiff pictured it, 177 but remained unmoved. It assumed that the transferee court would apply the Eighth Circuit interpretation but held that any difference in outcome did not present "a true conflict of laws problem, ' 17 but rather a matter to be resolved by the Supreme Court. 79 Not even plaintiff suggested that the federal court in Minnesota should apply the Second Circuit interpretation after transfer.
More significantly, in H.L. Green Co. v. MacMahon, 8 0 a case the Supreme Court cited and quoted in Van Dusen,"' 8 the Second Circuit confirmed in dictum that litigants have no vested right in a particular interpretation of federal law:
A plaintiff may not resist the transfer of his action to another district court on the ground that the transferee court will or may interpret federal law in a manner less favorable to him . . . .The federal courts comprise a single system applying a single body of law, and no litigant has a right to have the interpretation of one federal court rather than that of another determine his case.
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The assumption that each federal court is competent to decide federal questions is therefore inconsistent with preserving the selection of a given circuit's interpretation, just as it is inconsistent with an attempt to select a particular federal judge. 8 In each instance, the system abhors efforts to 175. 15 U.S.C. § § 80a-1 to -64 (1982 183. Within a given district, lawyers may be tempted to try to have a case assigned to a judge whom they view as receptive to their cause. Cf. J. GOULDEN, THE BENCHWARMERS 11-20, 114-57 (1974) (describing disparities in quality among federal judges). Nevertheless, such efforts are properly spurned on the ground that all judges are competent to decide cases. See Shopping for a Judge?, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 11, 1983, at 2, col. 2 (describing disciplinary action against lawyer for apparent judge Vol. 93: 677, 1984 undermine the authority of the assigned court to decide the case correctly on the merits.
Emphasizing the competence of federal courts rather than the plaintiff's interest in the most favorable interpretation of federal law also accords with the objectives of many federal statutes that Congress designed not only to provide compensation but also to achieve federal regulatory goals. For example, private claims for violation of the antitrust laws are meant to aid enforcement of those statutes, 18 4 and the private remedies provisions of the civil rights acts similarly were designed to assist efforts against racial discrimination. 8 5 The point is especially important where the courts have themselves implied a right to sue for damages in order to further congressional regulatory objectives. 86 In such circumstances, compensation is not the primary purpose of the private claim. In view of the regulatory objectives of many federal claims, it is inappropriate to give substantial weight to plaintiffs' attempts to capture a certain interpretation of federal law. Had plaintiffs selected this forum to avoid specific precedents in the Northern District, the case for a transfer would have been far stronger. Just as this district's local rules are designed to prevent shopping for individual judges-and thereby for the application of some anticipated view of the law-efforts to select one district to avoid or to obtain specific rulings of another district court should be disfavored and discouraged. 560 (1979) . The point here is that the principal objective for implying remedies, when that is allowed, is to further a congressional regulatory goal, not to provide private compensation.
187. Plaintiffs could argue that the congressional policy would always be furthered by rules favoring plaintiffs, but in reality regulation through private litigation is a two-edged sword. Indeed, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice is sufficiently concerned about overbroad interpretation of the antitrust laws in private litigation that it has participated in certain private cases to oppose positions taken by plaintiffs. William Baxter, Assistant Attorney General and head of the Antitrust The outer boundaries of the principle of competence are illustrated by the recurrent problems in applying statutes of limitations to transferred federal claims. Many federal claims, particularly those implied by the courts, lack congressionally set limitations periods. Arguably the federal courts could themselves fashion limitations periods, but they have steadfastly declined to do so on the ground that such an effort would involve inappropriate judicial legislation. 1 "" Put differently, the problem is beyond the competence of federal courts. Accordingly, the Supreme Court early directed that a federal court should apply the limitations period employed by the state in which it sits for the most closely analogous state law claim." 8 9 This approach, of course, has caused great disparities in limitations periods applied to certain federal claims' 90 and has raised interesting choice-of-law questions after transfer of such claims. In H.L. Green Co. v. MacMahon, ' 9 ' the Second Circuit decided that a transfer should not alter the limitations period that plaintiff had acquired by the exercise of his venue privilege, a conclusion implicitly adopted by the Supreme Court in its reliance on Green in Van Dusen.' 92 This conclusion is not inconsistent with the principle that federal courts are competent to decide issues of federal law, since federal courts are not competent to create limitations periods where Congress has failed to specify them. By default, the matter therefore turns on plaintiff's choice of forum. Many of the cases holding that the law of the transferor forum applies are hence correct because these cases actually only consider the statute of limitations question. 93 At least one court has explicitly recognized that determination of the limitations period is different from other issues, which the transferee court is of course competent to decide. 94 But there remains the problem of selecting the "analogous" state limitations period. On this federal question, some transferee courts make their own analysis, 9 ' while others follow the analysis of the transferor circuit. 98 Given the principle of competence, the transferee court should decide for itself.
B. Interpretation of the Transfer Statutes
Ultimately Van Dusen is a statutory construction case; the first sentence of the opinion announces that "[t]his case involves the construction and application of § 1404(a) .... ,,197 Given the assumption that applying
Van Dusen to transfers of federal claims violates the principle of competence, there remains the question whether the transfer statutes require that result.
This question is difficult to answer with absolute certainty. Since the principle of competence is a starting point, a substantial showing should be required to justify overriding it, and there appears to be no reason to do so. The legislative history of the transfer statutes provides little guidance. One could argue that permitting a change of law might frustrate the purposes of the transfer statutes by deterring courts from transferring, but the risk that courts would decline to transfer on this ground seems slight. More significant, therefore, are the numerous difficulties that would be caused by requiring the application of the transferor circuit's interpreta- As a consequence, Van Dusen will have some enduring effect on transferred federal claims until a federal principle for selection of a limitations period is developed. See supra note 189. But it is worth noting that Van Dusen should be inapplicable to federal issues in diversity cases, which the federal courts are competent to decide. For example, in a libel action the transferee court is competent to decide any First Amendment defense without deferring to the interpretation of the transferor federal court or the courts of the state in which the transferor court sits. Thus, the basic principle of competence endures.
194 tion. Accordingly, the statutes should not be interpreted as rejecting the principle of competence.
Legislative History
The legislative history of section 1404(a) says little about choice of law. Indeed, the drafters may never have considered which forum's law should apply to transferred cases. 1 98 In Van Dusen, the Supreme Court found the legislative history inconclusive and therefore relied on the assumption that Congress did not intend to alter the principle of venue privilege in diversity cases. When section 1404(a) was enacted, the principle of competence was also well established, however, and there is similarly no basis in the legislative history for concluding that Congress meant to depart from it.
The legislative history of the multidistrict litigation statute does provide an argument for applying transferor law to transferred federal claims, but the argument carries little weight. In hearings before the Senate subcommittee responsible for the bill that eventually became law, two witnesses who had been involved in the handling of the electrical equipment price fixing cases, 199 199. The many federal suits filed in the wake of the price fixing convictions in the electrical equipment industry, approximately 25,000 claims in nearly 2,000 suits, were administered by a Coordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation in the United States District Courts, which was established by Chief Justice Warren for that purpose. Dean Neal was Executive Secretary of the Committee, and Judge Becker was a member of it.
200. Dean Neal testified as follows in response to a question from Senator Tydings, sponsor of the legislation: SENATOR TYDINGS. Dean Neal, there would be a variety of questions of law involving substantive as well as procedural rights that would have to be decided by the transferee judge, such as capacity to sue, limitations and other bars to action, privileged communications, scope of discovery, and so forth. Are questions of choice of law sufficiently settled so that we do not have to spell it out in the legislation here, or do we need statutory guidelines? DEAN NEAL. I think the answer has been indicated quite clearly by the Supreme Court in the Van Dusen case ofr a year or two ago, in which the court held that in cases transferred under section 1404(a) the applicable law would be the law that would have been applied had the case remained in the transferor district. I see no reason to suppose that that rule would not govern under section 1407 as well. Dusen itself was carefully limited to questions of state law, 2 "' and the testimony of Dean Neal and Judge Becker seems to mean only that Van Dusen would apply to state law issues in cases transferred under the new statute. Since many diversity cases would be subject to transfer under the multidistrict statute, the testimony can best be interpreted as applying to such situations.
The contemplated functioning of the multidistrict transfer provision might support an argument that Congress intended transfers to effect no change in substantive law. Unlike section 1404(a), the new statute authorized transfer only for pretrial purposes. This limitation arguably shows that Congress wanted to guard against changes in applicable interpretation. Some commentators have in fact contended that the courts subsequently expanded the powers of the transferee courts to decide the merits of transferred cases beyond Congress' original intention. 2 " 2 But, in fact, transferee courts have usually decided transferred cases, 20 3 so the supposed restriction of their power to pretrial matters is hardly a basis for preserving transferor interpretation of federal law. As with section 1404(a), there is no helpful guidance in the legislative history of the multidistrict statute.
The Risk of Deterring Transfers
In Van Dusen, the Court reasoned that applying the law of the transferee state in diversity cases would frustrate the remedial purposes of section 1404(a) because courts would then be reluctant to grant transfers for fear of prejudicing plaintiffs' cases. 2 "" Obviously the prospect did not deter the district judge in Van Dusen, 2 " 5 but the risk that others would be deterred might still justify interpreting the transfer statutes to preserve plaintiff's original choice of law.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to evaluate the risk that courts would ultimately be deterred from transferring by application of the transferee's law to transferred federal claims. One decision by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation suggests that it might be. In In re Plumbing Fixtures Litigation, 208 a plaintiff in a tag-along case resisted transfer on the ground that, as an indirect purchaser, it would be prejudiced by a transfer to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which had held that indirect purchasers lacked standing to sue for price fixing. The Supreme Court had not yet resolved this issue. Without citing the legislative history, the Panel rejected plaintiff's argument on the ground that it was "clear" that Van Dusen required application of transferor law. 2 07 There is thus at least an implication that the Panel would otherwise have had second thoughts about transferring the case. Certainly the Third Circuit's holding in Piper Aircraft Co. v . Reyno-that dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds is never allowed where it will result in an adverse change of law 2°0 -suggests that there is a similar risk with motions under section 1404(a).
The risk nevertheless does not appear great. In large part, the Third Circuit's holding in Reyno was based on its interpretation of Van Dusen. 209 The Supreme Court's reversal in Reyno made it clear that such solicitude for plaintiffs' forum shopping was unwarranted. Moreover, plaintiffs' desire to capture a favorable interpretation of federal law or courts' solicitude for that desire hardly seems to counterbalance the principle of competence. In fact, the pre-Van Dusen cases concluded that a potential change in interpretation of federal law was irrelevant to a transfer motion because a plaintiff has no right to select among interpretations.'°F inally, the Multidistrict Panel's inclination to stress matters of judicial economy suggests that it will not expend judicial resources merely to preserve the plaintiff's desired interpretation of federal law. 2 
Difficulties Caused by Applying Transferor Interpretation
Applying Van Dusen to federal claims can cause three types of difficulties: problems in ascertaining foreign law, uncertainties about the breadth of the required borrowing from the transferor forum, and complications in consolidated cases. These difficulties could significantly increase the burdens upon federal courts. The transfer statutes were enacted to reduce such burdens by making more efficient use of the unitary federal system, and they should be interpreted accordingly.
a. Difficulty in Ascertaining Foreign Interpretation
Erie requires federal courts, upon deciding that state law governs a given issue, to determine what the controlling state law is. Often this task requires federal courts to resolve extremely difficult issues without precise guidance from the state cases. "13 The law of forum non conveniens was intended in part to extricate federal courts from such predicaments. Thus, when the Supreme Court upheld the common law power of a federal court to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds, it noted that such dismissal was permissible in part to save the court the trouble of having to "untangle problems . . . in law foreign to itself." 21 Similarly, Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno confirmed that dismissal was appropriate to avoid "'complex exercises in comparative law." 2 15 Applying Van Dusen to transfers of federal claims, however, would create equally severe problems of interpretation.
To put the matter in perspective, consider the difficulty that district courts often encounter in deciding what their own courts of appeals would hold on important issues. Particularly where the circuit is large, various panels may take different approaches to the same issue of federal law, leaving the district courts in a muddle pending an en banc resolution. This problem is serious enough to cause some to favor splitting up the larger circuits. Since issues on which the circuits conflict are often inherently difficult, any determination by a lower court on such issues prior to an en banc resolution is a challenging task.
This difficulty would be compounded were the transferee judge required to divine the attitude of another circuit on such questions. The absence of a recognized conflict would not mean that he could assume that the transferor circuit would decide a given issue in the same way as his 213. For a review of the "rules" that guide a federal court in this effort, see C. WRIGHT This concern is more common with non-American law, but it may apply as well to domestic issues. own circuit." 1 6 The transferee judge would need to examine the law of the transferor circuit in every case, and to guess what another circuit would say about the issue presented. Unlike a district judge in that circuit, the transferee judge could not even hope that an appeal would give him specific guidance. Instead, since appeal would be to the transferee circuit, the appellate court would face the same task as the transferee district judge.
The added burden of ascertaining foreign interpretations is not imaginary. 2 1 " In this era of hyperlexis, 2 " 8 federal district courts have enough difficulty rendering decisions on federal issues that are consistent with the views of the courts that review those decisions; it would be unnecessarily burdensome to require them to decide how other circuits would resolve those issues. The principle of competence does not assume that transferee judges can accomplish this task; neither should the transfer statutes.
b. Substance v. Procedure-How Broad the Reference?
Even if required to apply the interpretation of the transferor circuit, the transferee court could still apply its own rules with respect to some matters. Van Dusen confirmed that after transfer of diversity cases the plaintiff retains only that transferor law which would "significantly affect the outcome of the case." 2 1 9 The transferee court is free to apply its own "rules governing the conduct and dispatch of cases." '22 On its face, this statement appears to adopt a rule resembling one test used under Erie to 216. Indeed, the potential for conflicting decisions, even if unrealized, prevents federal court decisions from having binding national effect, and therefore is a factor which many argue supports reform of the federal appellate system. . 1982) , the court applied this distinction to a transferred federal claim. Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's complaint for securities fraud failed to satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), which requires particularity in pleading fraud. Plaintiff argued that the Third Circuit interpretation of Rule 9(b) should be followed because the case was originally filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and transferred to New York. The court rejected plaintiff's argument as "specious," reasoning that "rules governing pleadings, like the one involved here clearly are procedural and not substantive." Id. at 240 n.2. determine which matters in diversity cases must be decided by state law-the "outcome-determinative" analysis of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York. 22 1 In transferred diversity cases, the Guaranty Trust standard, though difficult to apply, is logical because it permits the transferee court to apply its own interpretation to the issues governed by federal law. 222 The same approach is of doubtful utility in cases where federal claims are transferred. Drawing the line between matters of substance and procedure could become difficult. Arguably, an outcome-determinative analysis would require application of the transferee court's interpretation of some or all of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Although Hanna v. Plumer held that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be applied to diversity cases so long as they are "arguably procedural, 22 3 that decision was grounded primarily on the Rules Enabling Act, 224 which provides authority for creation of the federal rules but gives no guidelines for distinguishing between varying interpretations of them. Yet differing approaches to matters such as the requisites for certification of a class under Rule 23225 could have a significant effect on litigation, a reality reflected in the now-discredited "death knell" justification for immediate appealability of denials of class certification. 2 26 Nor is the problem limited to matters governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; differences of approach to other "procedural" issues could be extremely important. For example, consider the showing necessary to justify entry of an injunction. In a diversity case, federal law would govern this issue because the availability of equitable remedies in federal court for the violation of rights created by state law is properly a matter of federal law. 2 7 But how does one resolve the problem if the transferee and transferor circuits themselves employ different standards for the issuance of an injunction? Moving even closer to substance, consider the popular doctrine of fraudulent concealment, used to toll the running of the statute of limitations where defendant has concealed his wrongdoing. In a diversity case, the availability of this doctrine is a matter governed by the applicable state law. 2 28 There are substantial disparities between different circuits, however, about how the doctrine should be applied to federal claims. 2 29 Should the transferor's approach be employed because it would be substantive for Erie purposes?
At present there is nothing to help the lower courts resolve these questions. The problems that they have encountered in answering analogous questions in diversity cases confirm the wisdom of interpreting the transfer statutes to avoid such confusion in federal claim cases by applying transferee law.
c. Complications in Consolidated Cases.
Consolidation of related cases is an important objective of both transfer statutes. The stated goal of multidistrict transfer is to allow coordinated or consolidated pretrial preparation.2 0 Similarly, under section 1404(a) the prospect of consolidation with litigation pending in the transferee court argues powerfully in favor of transfer. 2 1 This preference for combined treatment seeks to make the litigation more efficient and less burdensome 227 for both the parties and the court. Requiring application of transferor law could frustrate these objectives. Applying divergent legal standards may undermine consolidation. Consolidated cases can be handled effectively only if the same legal rules apply to them. 2 " 2 Even such seemingly straightforward matters as the scope of discovery may depend upon the application of the legal rules that later will be used to decide the lawsuit. It was for precisely this reason that the proponents of the multidistrict transfer statute insisted that the transferee court have the power to resolve such issues going to the merits as part of its power to control discovery. 2 "' Consolidation-and hence transfer-would be frustrated if such issues were resolved differently in different cases. Indeed, in Van Dusen itself the district court on remand decided against transfer because of the difference between the legal rules that would apply to the cases from Pennsylvania and those that would apply to the cases originally filed in Massachusetts. 2 ' While such difficulties are justified in diversity cases by the principles on which Van Dusen is based, the same principles do not apply to transferred federal claim cases. Unless both transfer statutes are interpreted to apply the law of the transferee court, such disarray may eventually characterize all transferred cases.
The lower courts have not yet directly confronted the problem of interpreting the transfer statutes, 23 5 but an indirect process leading to application of transferor law has occurred under the doctrine of the law of the case. Appropriately enough, it can be illustrated by the Plumbing Fixtures antitrust cases. 238 In Plumbing Fixtures, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation casually asserted that Van Dusen would apply to a transferred antitrust claim, thereby overcoming the objections of an indirect purchaser plaintiff that feared transfer to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which had already held that such plaintiffs lacked standing to sue.
23 7 In Philadelphia, however, Judge Alexander Harvey was compelled by circumstance to take a different tack despite prior assurances of fealty 233. Thus, Judge William Becker, testifying in support of the proposed multidistrict transfer statute, argued strongly in favor of giving transferee courts the power to decide legal issues. He asserted that "[it is impossible to separate discovery on factual issues from the power to make legal rulings" because the scope of discovery will often turn on such rulings. tive individual actions and affording relief to large numbers of people. Often such litigations begin with class action complaints filed in a number of locations, which leads almost inevitably to an effort to transfer them all to one district. Indeed, the Panel has explicitly recognized the pendency of overlapping putative class actions as a factor strongly favoring transfer."" After transfer, additional problems arise. The transferee judge must decide whether to certify a class. That task is inherently difficult, but it becomes more so if the court must also consider the interpretations of the antitrust or securities law of the various transferor courts. Should the classes, if certified, be segmented by circuit? Does the law governing the rights of the class depend upon where the action was originally filed, with all the class members, wherever they reside, riding the choice-of-law coattails of the named representative? 24 5 Among contending potential class representatives, is the choice-of-law issue relevant in selecting the class representative, giving the candidate who captured a favorable interpretation an edge? In diversity cases, the differences between legal standards can preclude the certification of a class consisting of residents of more than one state. 24 6 It would be unfortunate to undermine Rule 23 in cases involving federal claims as well.
CONCLUSION
There has been no rush to determine whether Van Dusen should apply to transferred federal claims despite the large number of transfers. The prospect of congressional action to revise the federal appellate structure may tempt the lower courts to continue to ignore this problem and simply to parrot Van Dusen without carefully considering its application. Whether or not Congress acts, however, problems from differing interpretations of federal law in transferred cases will not magically disappear. If Congress ever devises a solution to the problem of conflicts among the circuits, that development will provide yet another reason not to ask the transferee court to fathom and apply transferor law, since such a solution should rejuvenate a "national law" that is uniformly interpreted and make concerns about inconsistent decisions passE. Until that magic moment, however, the volume of transfers makes it important to decide the impact of differing interpretations on transferred cases.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court is unlikely to provide guidance. Although individual Justices may assert that the Court is unable to resolve all significant conflicts, 2 47 the Court cannot be expected to premise a decision on that inability. Moreover, in any case where the issue of choice between transferor and transferee interpretation might be presented, the Court would presumably decide the case on the merits rather than by promulgating rules regarding choice of interpretation. 2 4 Like the possibility of congressional action, the prospect of Supreme Court guidance is not a reason for delay. The lower courts must therefore decide for themselves. They are of course quite willing to decide most issues for themselves, thereby creating conflicts among the circuits, but they have not come to grips with the problems that these conflicts raise in transferred cases.
This Article has attempted to unravel the issues that should bear on the handling of these conflicts in transferred federal claims cases. As it has shown, Van Dusen correctly controls transfers of diversity cases because permitting a change of law would jeopardize Erie concerns. 249 But Erie is entirely irrelevant to transfers of federal claims. Acquired rights, the other ground for Van Dusen, provides no basis for deciding whether to apply the transferor's interpretation of federal issues. Accordingly, the reasoning of Van Dusen is inapplicable. In its place, this Article has proposed reliance on the principle that the transferee court is fully competent to decide issues of federal law. Requiring application of transferor interpretation would, by definition, offend this principle because it would only affect the 247. See supra note 1.
248. Thus, in Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960), discussed supra pp. 703-04, the Court, much to Justice Frankfurter's chagrin, gave no weight to the fact that the Seventh Circuit refused to accept the Fifth Circuit's earlier ruling in the same case as the law of the case. See supra note 163. Surely it would be less likely to address the consequences of a transfer on interpretation of federal law where the transferor circuit had not decided the actual case transferred.
249. See supra p. 695.
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Conflicts Among the Circuits outcome when the transferee court would reach a different result if free to decide the issues on the merits. The ultimate question this Article addresses, therefore, is whether the transfer statutes justify thus offending the principle of competence. Legislative history provides little useful insight. One possible justification, a desire not to deter other transfers, is not persuasive. In general, the risk seems small. Under the multidistrict litigation statute, moreover, the Panel's emphasis on judicial efficiency greatly reduces the importance of possible prejudice to plaintiffs. Finally, there seems to be little reason to prefer the transferor interpretation simply to protect plaintiffs who forum shop for favorable interpretations; already some courts have transferred federal claims despite protests that the claim is viable only in the transferor circuit.
50
The transfer provisions would, however, be impaired substantially by insisting upon adherence to transferor interpretation. Transferee judges would be burdened with the difficult task of divining the attitude of the transferor circuit; such adherence would present new problems in distinguishing between "substantive" matters, which are governed by transferor interpretation, and "procedural" matters, which are not; and consolidated treatment of transferred cases would become more difficult or perhaps impossible. In this day of escalating caseloads it is foolish to weaken the transfer devices, which attempt to utilize the unified federal judicial system to relieve part of the burden on the courts. The courts should therefore recognize that the transferee court must be free to decide a federal claim in the manner it views as correct without deferring to the interpretation of the transferor circuit. 
